We thank Jinfeng Lu, Amit Pazgal and Shubhranshu Singh, Hema Yoganarasimhan, and seminar/conference participants at the University of Wisconsin and 2015 SAET Meeting (Cambridge) for comments for comments. 
Introduction
Many important business, economic and political contexts involve rivals who must compete by allocating limited resources simultaneously across multiple markets or prizes. Not only must they decide how much to invest in building di¤erent markets, but also the extent to which they must compete in each market. Consider the following examples:
Drug companies spent an estimated $5.2 billion in 2015 in direct to consumer advertising. For new drugs such advertising may induce patients to ask their doctors about their suitability and thus potentially expand the market. The pharmaceutical industry deploys even larger amounts (e.g., $15 billion in 2012) to conduct detailing and promotional activities to doctors across di¤erent geographical markets. Detailing activities by medical representatives not only provides information to doctors about the basic drug action, but also involve e¤orts to persuade doctors to prescribe the …rm's drugs over those of rivals.
In the mobile phone market leading …rms like Samsung and HTC invest in promoting the Android platform to convince consumers to adopt the platform over the iPhone. However they also compete for market share in large Asian markets. HTC's advertising campaign is more e¤ective in its home market in Taiwan than in South Korea, and vice versa for Samsung.
Advertising campaigns in this product category can work to increase the generic demand for the product category, or it can persuade consumers about the advantages of a …rm's product over its rival(s). Samsung and HTC would have to decide on allocating advertising budgets based on the relative preference for their product in each market.
These examples represent some general aspects of competitive interactions in a variety of contexts: First the players/…rms have limited resources (advertising budgets, sales-force size) and they compete in multiple markets. This means that they have to decide on how much of the resource to allocate to each market, resulting in the decisions across markets to be a¢ liated. Allocating more to one market means less to others. Second, the markets can be di¤erentiated (as in the mobile phone market) with each …rm having home markets with relatively higher consumer preference.
Should …rms deploy more or less resources in markets where they are stronger?
Second, the examples also highlight a basic business strategy trade-o¤: Firms have to choose between surplus or value creation in each market versus competing for the value. In other words, the pie that …rms will …ght for is in itself endogenous. Further, a …rm's investment in creating value in a market can be subject to free-riding by the competitor who can deploy competitive resources to win the market. For example, pharmaceutical reps have to decide how much to focus their e¤orts on providing information about the basic drug action versus on persuading doctors that their drug is relatively superior. E¤orts to inform doctors about the basic drug action may also end up bene…ting competitors in a category. Similarly, direct to consumer advertising for a new class of drugs by one …rm can expand the potential market bene…ting all the …rms in the category. This feature is also related to the classic guns vs. butter trade-o¤ described in the con ‡ict literature:
i.e., in competitive markets economic agents may face a trade-o¤ between investing in producing goods of value versus investing to appropriate the value created by other agents (Hirshleifer 1988) .
Except that in this paper we examine the trade-o¤ in the context of multi-market interactions between players with limited resources.
We construct a framework to analyze multi-market value creation and the competition for that value. The anatomy of the game is as follows: Two …rms (players) with limited resources compete simultaneously for di¤erent markets which are located evenly on a unit line. Firms are located at the ends of the line and are di¤erentiated and each …rm's relative strength in a market depends upon the distance between the …rm's location and that of the market: the further a market is from a …rm's location the less e¤ective is the …rm's competitive rent-seeking spending. Firms simultaneously choose an allocation of their resource endowment among the markets in order to maximize their expected overall payo¤s. In each market they simultaneously choose the investment that will determine the size of the market (value or surplus creation) as well as the competitive outlay to win the market from the rival (competitive rent seeking). Firms' outlays in surplus creation are substitutable and they jointly determine the size of the value pie. This then allows for the possibility that the investments in surplus creation by one …rm is subject to free-riding by the other. In each market …rms'competitive spending jointly determine the winner through a Tullock contest success function (Tullock, 1980) . What would the equilibrium allocations be for the players be in terms of the surplus creation and the rent-seeking allocations across the di¤erent markets?
Consider …rst the case where each market has the same size which is exogenously …xed which implies that …rms face only the competitive rent-seeking incentive across the markets. Should a …rm defend closer markets in its home turf, or should it spend resources to win markets which are farther away and harder to win? We …nd that each …rm's equilibrium resource distribution has a non-monotonic inverted U-shape pro…le: Each …rm spends relatively less resources both in closer markets and in markets which are closer to its competitor. The …rms' outlays peak at a market in the middle which implies that the competition will be the most intense for the middle market. It is particularly interesting and counter to intuition that greater market di¤erentiation leads to a more concentrated resource distribution pro…le with even more intense competition in the middle markets. These results are consistent with the empirical studies of electoral competition in U.S. presidential elections (Stromberg 2008 We then analyze the general case in which market value is endogenously determined. Firms' choose not only the allocation across the markets, but also how to split the spending in each market between investments in market creation and in competitive rent-seeking: The former builds the market value or surplus, while the latter allows a …rm to compete for the value that is created.
Consider the case where the e¢ ciency of the productive investment of a …rm is the same across all markets which implies that …rms do not have any home turf advantage in more proximate markets.
With substitutable value creation e¤orts, the equilibrium market values are polarized: The home turfs of both …rms, i.e., the markets closest to the …rm locations have the highest equilibrium investments and markets which are closer to the middle have lower values. The …rms'allocations of competitive rent-seeking outlays are di¤erent from the pattern in the exogenous market size case.
Firms' competitive spending no longer peak in the middle, but rather in each …rm's turf. Firms do not compete most intensely in the most valuable markets, rather the intensity of competition is determined by the trade-o¤ between the equilibrium size of the markets and the ease with which the markets are contestable.
Greater market di¤erentiation leads …rms to invest relatively more in their home turfs at the expense of the middle markets and to reduce the overall amount of competitive spending. With asymmetric budgets, the …rm with the budget advantage balances its equilibrium actions such that it invests more in value creation and also deploys more in competitive spending. This result contrasts with what might be obtained in a single market value creation and competition model:
In that case, it is possible that the …rm with the lower budget may deploy greater competitive spending even as the …rm with the budget advantage invests more in value creation. Finally, as the budget asymmetry increases, the …rm with the advantage invests in more markets closer to the weaker …rm.
Our results also provide a competitive perspective on the e¤ects home market advantage, i.e., a systematic preference of consumers to purchase local products. The interesting question is when does this lead to a home turf bias in the equilibrium spending or investments by …rms. When the market values are exogenous, the spending in competitive rent seeking is actually higher in the middle markets rather than in the home turfs of the …rms. In contrast, with endogenous market values, the value creation investments of the …rms are higher in their home turfs even if all markets have the same productivity/e¤ectiveness in value creation. Thus we have the interesting point that even in the absence of any home turf advantage in value creation, the presence of di¤erentiation in competitive rent-seeking can lead to a home turf bias in the equilibrium value creation. When the …rms do have an home turf advantage, then predictably this leads to greater equilibrium investments in closer markets.
Related Research
This paper is related to the guns vs. butter literature initiated by Hirshleifer (1988) . In that literature rival agents can acquire surplus either by producing goods or by appropriating the output produced by others. Therefore, they must strategically allocate their resource endowment between output creating investments (butter) or appropriative technologies (guns) which helps to seize the output of others or defend one's own output. Our paper examines the resource allocation choice of players between value creating investments and competitive rent-seeking actions. This can be seen as the incentives and the trade-o¤s faced by …rms to collaborate in joint production of value and to compete for that value at the same time. Several papers, e.g., Skaperdas (1992) and Hirshleifer (1994) , have been developed along this line to investigate how …rms'resource position might a¤ect their allocation strategies (see Gar…nkel and Skaperdas (2007) Our analysis is also related to the contest literature and can be seen as new form of multidimensional proportional prize contest in which …rms allocate resources over a set of di¤erentiated markets. This enriches and qualitatively generalizes the framework of the Colonel Blotto game of duopoly con ‡icts in multiple battle…elds in which …rms allocate their resources among these battle…elds to maximize the sum of rents. The game was …rst proposed by Borel (1921) and analyzed by Borel and Ville (1938) in a special case of three markets. 1 We highlight the strategic e¤ects of an important aspect that is missing in the literature: The Colonel Blotto game assumes a zero-sum payo¤ structure. Our analysis obviously considers both the creation of the pie as well as competition for it. 2 To our knowledge, the existing literature on Colonel Blotto games has not considered a game which incorporates the trade-o¤ between market creation and rent-seeking as well as …rms'strategic interaction in multiple di¤erentiated markets. Within the standard Colonel Blotto class of games allowing for endogenous market creation as well as allocation across multiple di¤erentiated contests is analytically challenging. The game form developed in the paper contributes by providing a tractable proportional prize setup to analyze the guns vs. butter decisions in multimarket contests.
The paper is also related to a growing literature that applies contest/tournament type models of competition to marketing and I.O. issues, such as R&D and product development, and sale force allocation and incentives. The application of contest-like models in marketing goes back to the attraction models literature originating in Bell et al. (1975) which deals with marketing and promotional e¤ort competition for market shares. Recent work in marketing strategy include Ridlon and Shin (2013) who examine whether a …rm should favor weaker employees in an attempt to maximize the total sales e¤ort output in a repeated contest model. Iyer and Katona (2017) analyze competition as a contest for consumer attention in social communication markets, while Katona et al. (2017) model a contest between news providers who can strategically choose news topics. There is also a literature on sales contests which focuses on the optimal design of the prize structure to elicit sales agents e¤orts (see Kalra and Shi (2001) Gross and Wagner (1950) generalize the analysis to a …nite number of markets. A number of studies apply the model to various contexts, including campaign …nancing allocations (Lake, 1978) , advertising (Friedman, 1958) , and military defense (Clark and Konrad, 2007 , and Kovenock and Roberson, 2009), etc.
2 Kvasov (2007) and Roberson and Kvasov (2012) relax the usual assumption that resources are forfeited if they
were not used for rent-seeking competitions.
The Model
Consider two …rms/players indexed by i = 1; 2; that are located at the two ends of a unit line segment with …rm 1 located at zero (left edge) and the other …rm at location 1 (right edge). Each …rm is endowed with a …xed competitive resource budget m i : Without loss of generality, assume that m 1 m 2 > 0: Suppose that the line segment has a set of 2n + 1 markets (or prizes) which are equally spaced and indexed by k = 1; : : : ; 2n + 1: Market k = 1 is at …rm 1's location, while the market k = 2n + 1 is at …rm 2's location. Each of these k's could represent consumer market for a product, or an electoral market in a political contest, or di¤erent R&D projects that …rms may invest in. competitive or rent-seeking activities that are directed at winning the market from the rival. These could include comparative advertising or competitive promotional spending to convince consumers to buy from a …rm rather than from the rival.
Exogenous Market Values
We begin with a basic analysis of competition between the …rms when each market or prize has a …xed exogenous value v > 0: This means that each …rm would choose a competitive allocation strategy and …rm i's allocation strategy can be represented by a vector x i = (x i;1 ; : : : ; x i;2n+1 ), subject to its budget constraints, i.e., P 2n+1 k=1 x i;k m i . The e¤ectiveness of a …rm's competitive allocation in a market depends on the distance between its own location and the targeted market.
For an arbitrary market k given the …rms'choice of competitive outlays x i;k e¤ective outlays y i;k are given by:
Thus a …rm's competitive outlay is relatively more e¤ective in a market that is closer to it than to its rival. The e¤ectiveness of a …rm's spending depends upon the distance between the …rm and the market, and t 2 (0; 1] measures the e¤ectiveness loss caused by distance. In other words, it measures the extent of di¤erentiation between the …rms in their ability to compete for the di¤erent markets. Therefore in this competition each …rm is favored in its own turf because its spending has greater relative e¤ectiveness. Thus markets f1; : : : ; ng are the "turf" of …rm 1, and markets fn + 2; : : : ; 2n + 1g those of …rm 2.
In each market k the outcome of the competition is determined by a Tullock contest success function: Each …rm i wins a proportion of the market:
Note that ties are broken fairly if both …rms place zero outlays in any market, i.e., each …rm secures half of the market. As in the marketing literature based on contest like models (see, for instance, Bell et al., 1975) , the function p i;k can be interpreted as a share of market value …rm i secures from market k: The allocation decisions can be seen as determining the market shares in each market in a proportional and smooth manner. 3 We assume that the power term r 2 (0; 1) which implies the e¤ective outlays y i are a concave function which captures the standard idea of decreasing returns to additional marketing investments. Note also that this assumption of r 1 ensures a pure strategy equilibrium of the proportional prize contest interpreted as the competition for market share in our model (Gradstein and Konrad 1999, and Konrad 2009). 4 Each …rm chooses its allocation strategy to maximize its aggregate payo¤ from all the markets i (x i ; x j ) = P 2n+1 k=1 y i;k y 1;k +y 2;k v: For a given allocation strategy x j by its rival, a …rm i will solve a 3 Alternatively, the function p i;k can also be interpreted as a …rm's probability of winning the entire market k in a winner take all competition, as formulated in Tullock (1980) . Konrad (2009) and Sheremeta et. al (2018) provide additional discussion of these two standard ways to interpret the contest model. 4 More generally a unique pure-strategy equilibrium exists in a N player contest when r The …rm's allocation problem to maximize payo¤s embeds some important trade-o¤s: First given that the resource endowment is limited, investing more in any given market necessarily means reducing the allocation for one or more of the other markets. Second, the market di¤erentiation represented by t implies that each …rm has to decide how much to invest in its home turf versus attack its rival's turf. We establish the unique pure strategy equilibrium of this multi-market game.
Because unused budgets do not have any outside option value each …rm will exhaust its budget and P 2n+1 k=1 x i;k = m i . In section 3.2.1 we will consider the role of outside options. The …rst step in identifying the equilibrium is the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 There exists no equilibrium in which a …rm places zero outlay in any market, i.e., x i;k > 0, 8k 2 f1; : : : ; 2n + 1g.
Suppose there were to exist a market where both …rms did not allocate any resources, then it will be optimal for one of the …rms to shift an in…nitesimal amount of resource from elsewhere to this market. Doing so would provide the …rm with an incremental payo¤ of v while having a negligible e¤ect on the payo¤ of the …rm from the alternative market. Similarly, if only one …rm were to not allocate any resources in a given market, the other …rm would want to reduce its outlay to be negligibly small. Thus in equilibrium both …rms compete for each one of the available markets by deploying positive resource allocations.
We now proceed to describe the interior equilibrium of the game in which x i;k > 0, 8k 2 f1; : : : ; 2n + 1g. De…ne = Proposition 1 There exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the game with …xed market values. In each market k, …rms' allocate
, where (k) is given by
Firms spend the same proportion (k)
(k), of their resource budget in each market.
Hence, the ratio between …rms' bids remains constant across markets, i.e.,
One might think that a …rm can have lower incentives to spend in a market that is farther away and in the rival's home turf. But then it is also the case that it is easier for the rival to defend a closer market because its spending in such a market is more e¢ cient. The rival strategically lowers its spending in its home turf. These opposing incentives cancel out leading …rms to choose a constant ratio of resource allocation across markets. 5 The main point of interest in this proposition is the manner in which the …rms split their resource budgets among the 2n + 1 markets. De…ne~ (k) , ( kj t) P 2n+1 k=1 ( kj t), which is the portion of resource each …rm allocates in equilibrium to a market k. In the following proposition,
we explore the properties of the function~ (k) with respect to k.
Proposition 2 i) The function~ (k) …rst increases with k and peaks at a cuto¤ k n + 1. It then decreases if k < 2n + 1: ii) When …rms are symmetric (m 1 = m 2 ), the peak k is located at the middle market, i.e., k = n + 1; when …rms are asymmetric, i.e., m 1 > m 2 , the peak k is located right to the mid-point, i.e., k > n + 1.
The resource allocation function~ (k) is non-monotonic in k: Consider the case of symmetric …rms (m 1 = m 2 ). Each …rm's allocation increases as it moves towards the center on its home turf peaking at the market n + 1 in the middle and so the …rms compete most intensely in the middle of the market. In markets close to its location a …rm strategically withdraws and allocates less because its spending is more e¤ective. Whereas it also allocates less in markets that are farther away and in the competitor's turf precisely because its spending is relatively less e¤ective. This leads to an inverted U-shaped equilibrium resource allocation pro…le with the maximum allocation by both …rms in the middle.
The above result can be related to empirical studies in political markets. In U.S. presidential elections rival candidates must decide how to allocate their advertising budgets and their campaign- When the …rms are asymmetric and m 1 > m 2 ; the spending peak, k ; shifts to …rm 2's turf.
The most intense competition takes place in a market in the weaker …rm 2's turf and the greater the asymmetry between the …rms the closer is the peak to …rm 2's location. The general result in the contest literature is that a more balanced playing …eld leads to more competition. In any given market k; the balance in the playing …eld depends on a) the e¤ectiveness of the …rms' spending which is determined by the distance between the market k and each …rm, and b) the …rms' budgets. Symmetric …rms have an advantage in their own turfs, and therefore the highest spending and competition occurs at the mid point. When they are asymmetric, the most intense competition occurs in a market which is in …rm 2's turf, where the closer distance of the market to …rm 2 can counteract the disadvantage of its smaller budget.
E¤ect of Market Di¤erentiation and Other Comparative Statics
How does the extent of di¤erentiation of the market a¤ect the equilibrium strategies? We turn our attention to this question in the next proposition:
Proposition 3 i) For symmetric budgets, the ratio~
strictly increases with t for k < n+1, while it strictly decreases for k n+1, i.e., competitive rent-seeking resources are increasingly spent in the markets closer to the middle. ii) For asymmetric budgets, @k @t 0, the spending peak k shifts towards the left side of the line.
Note that~
is the ratio of spending on market k + 1 as compared to market k and this ratio strictly increases with market di¤erentiation for k < n + 1, while it strictly decreases for k n + 1: As t increases, distance of a market from a …rm causes a greater attenuation of the …rm's spending e¤ectiveness and so each …rm gets a greater advantage in markets which are in its own
turf. This reduces a …rm's spending in more remote markets and therefore provides incentives for the rival to also spend less in protecting closer markets. Thus we get the unexpected result that greater t leads to increasingly intense competition in marginal markets which are in the middle.
This result is noteworthy precisely because an increase in t is equivalent to the market being Firm 2 substitutes for its lack of resources by the e¤ectiveness of its spending in closer markets. Figure 1 illustrates the comparative statics. Finally, increases of r leads k to move rightward: As r increases the competition for the markets becomes more discriminatory and this magni…es Firm 2's disadvantage forcing it to focus more on closer markets.
Endogenous Budget Choices
We now extend the basic model by allowing …rms to endogenously choose their budgets and therefore the amount of spending they would want to deploy in the market competition. The incentive of …rms to choose budgets can be represented in two important ways: First, …rms might have an alternative use or outside option for their budget endowments m i : In this case …rms must decide how much of their budget endowment to deploy in the market versus on the outside opportunity.
Second, …rms may choose the amount of budget resources to deploy given that they have increasing costs. Both these possibilities are examined below.
Budget Choice with Outside Options
Suppose that each …rm has a potential alternative use for its budget: Speci…cally, each …rm i can invest its endowment in a numeraire good x i;0 , which has unit marginal utility. As before …rm 2 has a (weakly) larger endowment, m 2 m 1 . Each …rm's strategy is given by a vector x i = (x i;0 ; x i;1 ; : : : ; x i;2n+1 ) and the following maximization problem:
x i;k 0; 8k 2 f1; : : : ; 2n + 1g;
As before in equilibrium each …rm will allocate its budget across the markets k 2 f1; : : : ; 2n+1g such that they yield the same level of marginal utility. Obviously, there exists no equilibrium in which either of the …rms invests zero resources in competitive rent-seeking activities. De…nẽ
, a …rm i's endogenously determined total spending on competition across all markets. Further, de…ne
Proposition 4
The following characterizes the equilibrium of the game with outside options:
, both …rms deploy their entire budget on market competition, i.e.,
v , then neither …rm's invests all of its budget in market competition. There exists a unique m , which satis…es
. Each …rm spends x i0 = m i m on the numeraire good,
iii. (Hybrid Equilibrium) When m 2 > m 1 and the condition (m 2 jm 1 ;m 2 )jm
holds, …rm 1 exhausts its budget on rent-seeking activities, while …rm 2 does not. There exists a uniquem 2 , which satis…es
Firm 2 spends in totalm 2 on competitive rent-seeking, and m 2 m 2 on the numeraire good.
Proof. See Appendix.
The endogenous choice of the …rms to invest in market competition in the presence of outside options depends upon the value of the market relative to the size of the budget endowments of the …rms. When the value of the market (v) is relatively large, while the budgets endowments of both …rms are not too large (
), we have a corner equilibrium in which both …rms exhaust their entire budgets in market competition and thus there is no spending on the outside option. This case reduces to our basic model in the previous section with …xed budgets and the presence of outside options does not a¤ect the results.
In contrast, when (
), then neither …rm will exhaust its entire budget because the market value is relatively small while the budget endowments of both …rms are su¢ ciently large. It is interesting to observe that there is ex-post symmetry in the equilibrium, in the sense that …rms spend the same amount of resources on competitive rent-seeking despite the asymmetry in their budgets. Thus in this case both …rms deploy some part of their budgets on their outside opportunity. Finally, we have a hybrid equilibrium, in the sense that the …rm with the smaller budget, spends all its resources on rent-seeking activities, while the …rm with the larger budget divides its budget between rent seeking and the numeraire good. This happens when v falls in an intermediate range or when the di¤erential between m 1 and m 2 is su¢ ciently large.
It is also useful to explore how the extent of market di¤erentiation (t) a¤ects the amount of the budget allocated to market competition versus the outside opportunity.
Corollary 1 When t increases, (i) the corner equilibrium is more likely to emerge, in which case both …rms spend all their budget resources on competitive rent-seeking; (ii) in the fully interior equilibrium, …rms spend more budget resources on competitive rent-seeking as compared to the outside option; (iii) in the hybrid equilibrium, …rm 2 spends more of its budget resources on competitive rent seeking.
We have the interesting …nding that greater market di¤erentiation actually leads …rms to tilt their resource allocation more towards rent-seeking market competition. This result may be seen as contrary to intuition because one might think that an increase in t should lead to a less e¤ective competitive rent-seeking technology. However, with increasing t a …rm's advantage in closer markets increases, while its incentive to invest in remote markets goes down, which leads to a reduction in rent dissipation (wasted spending). Consequently, …rms end up with a higher marginal bene…t from their competitive rent-seeking activities. In turn, this leads them to divert more resources towards market competition, rather than the outside opportunity.
Costly Budgets
Another natural way to relax the …xed budget assumption is to consider the endogenous choices of …rms when the budget decisions are costly (Snyder 1989 ). Speci…cally, suppose that a …rm's choice of x i;k involves a constant marginal cost c i . Without loss of generality, let …rm 1 have a cost advantage, such that c 2 c 1 > 0. Such a cost may represent the …rm's cost of raising additional capital or productive resources (e.g., sales force size) that is required for the market.
Recall that …rms' e¤ective outlays in a k are given by (1) and …rm i, at market segment k, wins with a probability given by the contest success function in (3).
Firms simultaneously commit to their distributions of spending outlays in the 2n + 1 segments.
For each segment k, …rms'marginal bene…ts are:
The equilibrium is determined by the following conditions:
From this we have that in equilibrium
. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 5 In the equilibrium, …rm i will deploy a competitive spending allocation given by
] o 2 v in each market k, i 2 f1; 2g; k 2 f1; : : : ; 2n + 1g.
It can be seen that x i;k peaks in a market k n + 1, and each …rm has an inverse U-shaped distribution of competitive spending outlays similar to what is described in Proposition 2 for the case of …xed budgets. Thus with endogenous budget choices all the results obtained in section 3
for the case of exogenously …xed budgets are robust with the lower cost …rm being analogous to the …rm with the higher budget.
Endogenous Value Creation: Guns vs. Butter
We now consider the full model in which the …rms compete by spending in both value creation as well as rent seeking. Firm i's spending in each market k is a pair (b i;k ; x i;k ): Recall that b i;k is a productive investment that increases the surplus or value created in market k, while x i;k is the …rm's competitive rent-seeking spending that helps it to get a larger share of the surplus in the market.
Firms simultaneously commit to their strategy (b i ; x i ) , where b i is the vector (b i;1 ; : : : ; b i;2n+1 ),
and is increasing and strictly concave in each argument. Further, v k (0; 0) = 0 and
We can then show that:
Lemma 2 There exists no equilibrium in which both …rms do not make positive productive investments in a market k, i.e., v k > 0, 8k 2 f1; : : : ; 2n + 1g.
Suppose there were to be a market in which neither …rm invests. In that case both …rms do not have to deploy competitive rent-seeking spending in that market. This means that one of the …rms can gain from decreasing its investment in some other market where it faces competition and shifting it to this market. Thus we have that all markets will have positive surplus, and given this we know that the competitive rent-seeking spending must be positive everywhere as well.
To carry the analysis further we assume that v k = p b 1;k + b 2;k : This functional form represents the contexts of multi-market competition which motivate our analysis in which the investments in value creation are substitutable and hence subject to free riding. For example, in pharmaceutical markets the …rms might invest in DCTA to inform consumers and increase visits to doctors creating primary demand for the product category. Similarly, major cell phone manufacturers like Samsung and HTC have promoted the Android platform to move consumers from the iPhone to Android. The incremental demand for Android phones created by these promotional activities can be appropriated by rivals in a market. As another example, in the early days of the nascent satellite radio market, both the major competitors Sirius and XM invested in advertising which jointly expanded the overall category, in addition to brand-speci…c advertising (see Bass et al. 2005 ).
Symmetric Budgets
This game described above highlights two simultaneous and related trade-o¤s: How to allocate the limited budget between value (surplus) creation and competition? And how to allocate the budget across the di¤erent markets. To explore these trade-o¤s, consider …rst the case where …rms are ex ante symmetric, with m 1 = m 2 = m. For simplicity, we consider the case of r = 1. The following proposition characterizes the unique symmetric equilibrium of this game.
Proposition 6 There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium. In the equilibrium, Firm 1 makes positive investment b 1;k in surplus creation only for markets k n + 1 (Firm 2's strategy is symmetric for markets k n + 1) given by
where~ is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier as de…ned in the Appendix.
The equilibrium surplus created in market k is
Finally, the two …rms choose the same equilibrium competitive rent-seeking spending in each market given by:
The proposition identi…es the trade-o¤ between value creation and competition. Firms have the incentive to invest in value creation only in markets which are in their own turf and in the middle (n + 1) market, but they compete for every market. Speci…cally, Firm 1's investments in creating value decreases with k for k for k < n + 1, while Firm 2's investments decreases between from market 2n + 1 to k > n + 1. Thus …rms concentrate more on building value in closer markets and the markets 1 and 2n + 1 end up being the one with the highest value, while the middle market n+1, generates the least amount of equilibrium surplus. Figure 2a shows the distribution of surplus across the markets in equilibrium. 6 This result can also be viewed in the context of the idea of home market advantage; i.e., a systematic preference of the market/consumers to purchase local products. The natural question We can note from the Proposition that the competitive spending (rent-dissipation) rate for
As in the exogenous market value case, it strictly increases with k for k < n + 1, and strictly decreases for k n + 1. But the equilibrium investment in value creation has an opposite pro…le leading to the highest amount of surplus v k created at the market coincident with the …rms, while the middle market has the lowest surplus size. Thus the incentive to compete most intensely for the middle market is o¤set by the fact that in equilibrium it will have the smallest size. Hence, the distribution of competitive rent-seeking bids are no longer single-peaked as in the case of …xed market values. Figure 2b . shows the distribution of competitive rent-seeking expenditures.
To examine the distribution of the competitive spending further, note that by symmetry, we will have in equilibrium that x i;k = x i;((2n+1) (k 1)) , and so without loss of generality, we focus on the left side of the line for Firm 1, i.e., k n + 1. Recall
] o 2~ and
] o~ , which gives
We want to evaluate how x i;k changes with k: Because [1
2n+1 ) > 0, to evaluate x i;k with respect to k, it is su¢ cient to examine the numerator and it can be shown that its sign depends upon [t(4n + 3 3k) (2n + 1)] :
Corollary 2 (a) Within each half of the line, the distribution of …rms' competitive rent-seeking expenditures is in general non-monotonic. The competitive spending x i;k reach their peak symmetrically in two marketsk 1 andk 2 , withk 1 = 2(n + 1) k 2 < n + 1 and correspondinglỹ k 2 = 2(n + 1) k 1 > n + 1:
(b) The locations of the peak competitive spending move toward the midpoint as t increases and the …rms becomes more di¤ erentiated .
The distribution of competitive spending is no longer monotonic within each …rm's turf. As already described above the middle market no longer faces the most intense competition. Rather in an interesting contrast to the case of exogenous market values, we get that each …rm chooses the highest the competitive spending at two symmetrically located markets on either side of the middle market k = n + 1: Thus when …rms endogenously create the market, the most intense competition shifts to each …rm turf, and this re ‡ects the balance between …ghting in markets where there is more surplus vs. in markets where competitive spending is more e¤ective in winning the market from the rival.
The particular pattern depends on the size of t. Consider, for instance, the case of t = 1.
The expression [t(4n + 3 3k) (2n + 1)] reduces to 2(n + 1) 3k. The competitive spending x i;k increases and then decreases after reaching an interior peak. In contrast, suppose that t is su¢ ciently small, i.e., t 2n+1 4n , the most intense competition simply occur in each …rm's home court because in this case, [t(4n + 3 3k) (2n + 1)] k=1 0. The second part of the corollary shows the interesting e¤ect of …rm di¤erentiation on the competitive spending. The markets with the most intense competition are closer to the middle even as di¤erentiation increases.
We now examine how market di¤erentiation a¤ects the extent to which …rms invest in value creation versus spending on competitive rent-seeking. This analysis is tractable for the three-market case for which we get:
Proposition 7 Consider a three-market case with n = 1. When t increases, …rms invest less in the middle market and invest more on their home markets, i.e., dt > 0. They deploy less in competitive rent-seeking activities in all markets, i.e., dx k dt < 0; 8k 2 f1; 2; 3g.
The degree of market di¤erentiation a¤ects both i) …rms' division of resources between rentseeking activities and value-creating investments, and ii) their resource allocations across market.
With greater market di¤erentiation both …rms invest less in the middle market, and more in their own turfs. A more di¤erentiated market leads to lower e¤ectiveness of a …rm's competitive spending in the remote market, and strengthens its advantage at its own turf. This increases the return to the …rm's investment in its own turf, as it is more able to protect it from possible predation. Hence, …rms shift investments in value creation to closer markets in their own turfs. At the same time, the greater advantage in the home market reduces the rival …rm's ability to win those markets, which leads each …rm to reduce its competitive expenditure accordingly. Further, because …rms invest less in the middle market, the reduced value also elicits less competitive spending in the middle.
Asymmetric Budgets
Finally, consider the general case that allows …rms to be endowed with asymmetric budgets with m 1 > m 2 . Despite the asymmetry, Lemma 2 continues to hold: There exists no equilibrium in which a market ends up with zero surplus. As a result, both …rms will invest in competitive rentseeking activities in all markets, i.e., x i;k > 0; 8i 2 f1; 2g; k 2 f1; : : : ; 2n + 1g. While a closed-form solution to the equilibrium cannot be obtained due to the nonlinearity of the production function and the budget asymmetry, it is still possible for us to characterize important properties of the equilibrium.
Proposition 8
When m 1 > m 2 we have that in equilibrium: a. Firm 1 invests more in value creation and deploys higher competitive rent-seeking spending.
b. The equilibrium surplus across markets, v k , is distributed as a U-shaped curve, strictly decreasing …rst and then strictly increasing. c. A …rm makes more investments in value creation in markets closer to its own location.
d. Firm 1 makes investment in value creation in markets 1 to k, with k n + 1, while only Firm 2 invests in markets k + 1 to 2n + 1. Firm 2 may also invest on k (in a knife-edge case), but for markets f1; : : : ; 2n + 1g nf kg only one …rm invests in equilibrium.
In the equilibrium, the ratio between …rms'competitive rent-seeking expenditures remains constant across all markets (i.e., But at the same time it also invests more in value creation. This contrasts with the …nding in the literature on single-market guns and butter competition that the …rm with the budget advantage may invest more in value creation (butter) while the weaker …rm with the smaller budget invests more in guns (see Skaperdas 1992) . Because the joint surplus is subject to competition, this leads to the …rm with the smaller budget ending up with a larger expected payo¤s. In contrast, part (a) of proposition shows that this result does not carry over to value creation competition in multi-market settings. With multiple markets and with market di¤erentiation, …rms have to trade-o¤ where to invest as well as how much to invest in value creation and in rent seeking competition. This allows for greater productive investments in closer markets by Firm 1 where Firm 2's competitive spending is less e¢ cient.
As shown in the proposition, in general, in each market only one …rm makes productive investments and so the equilibrium value creation pro…les of the two …rms are mutually exclusive.
This can be seen as a strategic attempt by each …rm to reduce free-riding of their value creation investments. This is di¤erent from the symmetric case, where we see (minimal) overlap: i.e., both …rms overlap in a single market in the middle (n + 1). The overlap is thus an artifact of symmetry.
In the asymmetric case, Firm 1 invests on strictly more number of markets than Firm 2. The distribution of value creation is similar to that in the symmetric case and each …rm is more willing to invest in markets closer to its own position. As a result, the market values are distributed as a U-shape curve: Firm 1's investments strictly decrease toward the other end of the line until it stops investing; in contrast, …rm 2's investments pick up in markets closer to the right end of the line. This observation is qualitatively similar to that in the symmetric case. In the symmetric case, equilibrium productive investment is minimized at the middle market, i.e., n + 1. In the asymmetric case, as expected, it is minimized at a market to the right of the middle point, because of the asymmetry. In fact, if the asymmetry is su¢ ciently large, Firm 2 may stop investing in value creation, and focus its resource only on competitive rent-seeking activities.
We can also establish some comparative statics pertaining to how the extent of asymmetry in the …rms' budgets a¤ect their strategies: Speci…cally, greater asymmetry in the budget between the …rms ( ) leads to increases in the equilibrium k: i.e., Firm 1 makes productive investments in more markets while Firm 2 invests in fewer markets. Consistent with this result greater budget asymmetry also leads to increases the ratio of …rms'competitive expenditure (
). Firm 1 therefore deploys relatively higher spending in rent-seeking. Thus the overall message is that in the presence of market di¤erentiation and multi-market interactions greater budget advantage leads a …rm to balance its actions such that it not only invests relatively more in value creation, but also competes with greater resources.
E¢ ciency Di¤erences in Productive Investments
Until this point we assumed that the market di¤erentiation pertains to the competitive rent seeking e¤orts of the …rms, and not to the productive investments. This may be seen as consistent with the contexts that motivate the paper: For example, generic advertising which informs new consumers about the objective characteristics of the product category should have similar e¤ects on whether they consider purchasing in the category irrespective of their relative preference for that …rm. In this section we consider an extension in which a …rm's e¢ ciency in productive investments declines as the distance of the market from the …rm increases. Speci…cally, we assume that by investing an amount b i;k , a …rm's e¤ective investment in a market segment k is given bỹ
with d 2 (0; 1]. We consider only su¢ ciently small d to ensure the existence of well-behaved equilibrium. As in the basic model, we derive symmetric equilibrium, with x 1;k = x 2;k = x 1;2n+1 (k 1) = x 2;2n+1 (k 1) and b 1;k = b 2;2n+1 (k 1) .
Proposition 9
In the symmetric equilibrium, each …rm deploys competitive rent-seeking spending
in market k, where v k is the equilibrium market value and~ is a constant speci…ed in the Appendix.
Firm 1 makes positive productive investments in markets 1; : : : ; n + 1, while …rm 2 in markets n + 1; : : : ; 2n + 1. Each market has an equilibrium value
o~ ; k 2 f1; : : : ; n + 1g
o~ ; k 2 fn + 1; : : : ; 2n + 1g:
Further, we obtain the following observations in the equilibrium.
Corollary 3
In the symmetric equilibrium, (i) v k strictly decreases with k for k 2 f1; : : : ; n+1g and strictly increases for k 2 fn+1; : : : ; 2n+ 1g.
(ii) The rent-dissipation rate, i.e., x k =v k strictly increases with k 2 f1; : : : ; n + 1g and strictly increases for k 2 fn + 1; : : : ; 2n + 1g.
Even if the e¢ ciency of productive investments declines with distance, the equilibrium yields similar implications to those obtained in the baseline model. Firms invest more in segments closer to their own turfs, and market rents bottom out at midpoint. However, …rms continue to compete more intensely in the middle. The same trade-o¤ occurs in the extended setting: Competition dissipates a larger portion of rents in the middle even as the value creation is smaller.
Finally, its is useful to consider the limiting case in which t = 0. This is the opposite to our baseline model: Firms no longer have home turf advantage in competitive rent seeking in closer markets, but they are more productive in creating value in these closer markets. The analysis reveals the following:
The rent-dissipation rate, 1 4~ , now becomes uniform across the di¤erent markets. However, the equilibrium market values v k are strictly decreasing with k for k n + 1, and increasing for k n + 1. As a result, competitive rent-seeking spending x k also decreases with k for k n + 1 and then increases.
Conclusion
This paper develops a theory of multi-market interactions which brings together two basic tradeo¤s common to many important economic and business contexts: First, …rms must invest resources in value creation which they can pro…tably extract. But in competitive markets they also have to compete for the market with rivals. This leads to the trade-o¤ of allocating limited resources to creating the market versus competing for it. Second, …rms competing in di¤erentiated markets must also decide how to allocate resources between di¤erent markets where they have more or less competitive advantage. In this paper we develop and analyze a model of multi-market competition which captures these trade-o¤s and their e¤ects on …rm strategies.
When the market size is …xed then the …rms' allocation strategies are only governed by the competitive rent seeking incentives and each …rm's equilibrium resource allocation strategies follow an inverted-U pro…le. A …rm spends less in closer markets where its spending is relatively more e¤ective because it is easier to defend these markets from competition. At the same time it also spends relatively less in far away markets precisely because its spending is relatively less e¤ective and it is harder to win these markets from competition. Thus the most intense competition is for a market in the middle. Further, and counter to intuition, the competition for the marginal market in the middle becomes more intense even as the …rms become more di¤erentiated.
Next the paper considers the dual trade-o¤ in which …rms decide how much to invest in creating value in each market as well as how much to spend in competing for the markets. In equilibrium a …rm invests more in closer markets and the investment pro…le declines monotonically. For symmetric …rms this leads to the most intense competition to move away from the middle market to one in each …rm's turf. We also …nd that with asymmetric budgets the …rm with the advantage invests more in both value creation as well as in competitive rent-seeking spending. As the budget asymmetry increases the …rm with the advantage invests in more markets closer to the weaker …rm. Greater market di¤erentiation leads to more value creation by …rms in their home turfs and a reduction in the overall amount of competitive spending.
In the standard tradition of contest models, our study assumes that …rms'strategic decisions are resource investments rather than prices. Thus our model can be seen as representing market situations in which prices are either non-strategic while …rms make advertising or selling allocations (for example in the pharmaceutical and health market), or markets where prices are not relevant (for example political markets). There exist no analytically tractable models in the contest literature with pricing. This is because if …rms'ability to price depends on the outcome of the rent-seeking (advertising) competition, this could potentially lead to endogenously determined market rents.
A contest model with pricing is de…nitely worth studying. One possible micro foundation is to consider a logit like consumer choice formulation, but such a setup might require numerical analysis.
Suppose we have a model such that a …rm is able to increase its product's value to consumers if the …rm prevails in advertising competition. Then compared to our analysis with …xed and uniform market values, a …rm is more able to protect its existing advantage at closer market segments, which deters the rival …rm from aggressive spending. In contrast, in middle markets where neither …rm has a clear advantage, a …rm should be able to price higher once it prevails in the advertising competition. This would compel both …rms to step up spending e¤orts. We would therefore expect a qualitatively similar prediction that …rms spend less in markets closer to the ends of line, while competing more in markets towards the middle.
An aspect of the problem that we have not explored is the role of potential uncertainty of …rms about their rivals. For instance, a …rm might be uncertain about the size of its rival's resource budget and the nature of this uncertainty should have a bearing on the extent to which …rms invest in value creation versus rent seeking. The analysis of multi-market guns and butter competitions under incomplete information is a challenging problem which may be investigated in future work.
Proof of Lemma 1
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there exists a market k 0 2 f1; : : : ; 2n + 1g such that x i;k 0 = x j;k 0 = 0:
Then let …rm i deviate by …nding an in…nitesimal "; such that it places an outlay of " in market k 0 , but reduces its bid in some other market k 00 by ": In this case, it will gain v at market k 0 with probability one, but its probability of winning v in market k 00 decreases negligibly. By continuity, the …rm must get strictly better with such a deviation, which establishes the contradiction.
Suppose now that x j;k 0 > 0 and x i;k 0 = 0. Now …rm j can always gain by reducing x j;k 0 to an in…nites-imally small " and reallocating to other markets. This means that …rm i has the incentive to deviate from x i;k 0 = 0, which establishes a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 1
Evaluating i with respect to an arbitrary x i;k yields
An interior optimum must satisfy . We then have x 2;k = x 1;k for all k. We can then rewrite
We then have x i;k = (k) (k 0 ) x i;k 0 and we must recursively obtain x i;k =
(1) x i;1 : Further, the resource (budget) constraints can be rewritten as
As a result, we have = m2 m1 and
, and therefore
, and
This proves the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2
Apparently,~ ( kj t) continues to be single-peaked, as the sign is determined by the term 8 > > > < > > > :
(2n + 1)
. If k is treated as a continuous varaible, the function~ ( kj t) is then maximized at k =k. Hence,~ ( kj t) reaches its peak at
Obviously,k decreases with . It has a value of precisely
= n + 1. This implies that in the asymmetric case, the peak appears to the right of n + 1.
Because < 1, r decreases with r. As a result,k increases with r.
Proof of Proposition 3
Evaluatingk with respect to t leads to
Let '(t) denote the numerator. We have '(t) rewritten as
This is further rewritten as
It is negative because < 1.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. An optimum requires
8k; k 0 2 f1; : : : ; 2n + 1g; k 6 = k 0 . Hence, we continue to have
; 8k; k 0 2 f1; : : : ; 2n + 1g; k 6 = k 0 . Analogous to the baseline setting, we must obtain recursively
A …rm i's marginal utility from its advertising in market segment 1 is given by
, which further leads to
. We then rewrite the condition to obtain a …rm's marginal utility from rent-seeking activities:
Before we proceed, we …rst verify the following.
Claim 1 The function strictly decreases withm i .
Rewrite as
We …rst verify the negative e¤ect ofm 2 . Consider each item in the sum:
Because r 1, the numerator is nonincreasing withm 2 ; the denominator strictly increases with it. Hence, the sum must strictly decreases withm 2 .
We then considerm 1 . Consider the inverse of each item in the sum:
The numerator strictly increases withm 1 , while the demoninator is independent of it. Hence, the item in the sum must be strictly decreasing with it, so is the sum.
Our main claim can then be veri…ed. There are altogether three cases. Recall
which indicates a …rm's marginal utility obtained from rent-seeking activities.
Case 1:
. In this case, (m 1 jm 1 ;m 2 )jm
1, which implies that both …rms obtain higher marginal utilities from rent-seeking activities even if they spend all their resources on those. Then the numerie goods will be ignored entirely.
Case 2: (m 2 jm 1 ;m 2 )jm
In this case, both …rms end up with lower marginal utilities from rent-seeking activities than the numerie good when they allocate all resources to rent seeking. Then investment on the numerie good cannot be zero and interior equilibrium emerges. The interior equilibrium requires
which thus impliesm 1 =m 2 = m. Then we have
It strictly decreases with m. There must exist a unique interior solution m , which satisi…es obtains a lower marginal utility from rent seeking when all resources go to such activities than the numerie good. So …rm 2 must divide its resources between rent seeking and the numerie good. Firm 1, however, prefers to spend all its resources on rent-seeking activities.
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. We …rst take …rst order derivative of the term
] r o 2 with respect to t for an arbitrary k. The sign of this derivative is the same as that of
We only need to look at the sign of the numerator. Rewrite it as
The sum is positive when t = 0. Evaluating it with respect to t yields
=
; :
This is negative because
To see that, note (k 1)(2n + 1 k) n 2 .
We now consider the situation of t = 1. In this case, the sum is rewritten as
It increases with . Let = 1. In this case, the terms in the bracket can be written as 2(k 1)(2n + 1 k)(2n + 1) + 2n(2n + 1) + 2(k 1)(2n + 1 k)2n
which veri…es the claim.
Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose otherwise. Then neither …rm would exert competitive rent-seeking e¤ort in a market with no surplus. Hence, a …rm can strictly increase its payo¤ by decreasing its investment from other markets where its rival also invests, but increase its investment in this market where it is the sole claimant of the market surplus.
Proof of Proposition 6
We …rst demonstrate that in any symmetric equilibrium, …rms exert the same amount of rent-seeking e¤ort on every market, i.e., x 1;k = x 2;k ; 8k 2 f1; : : : ; 2n + 1g.
Symmetric equilibrium, with (b 1;k ; x 1;k ) = (b 2;2n+1 (k 1) ; x 2;2n+1 (k 1) ), leads to 1 = 2 . Hence,
which gives x 1;k = x 2;k . De…ne~ = 1 = 2 and x k = x 1;k = x 2;k . The Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be rewritten as
It is impossible to have
=~ for k 6 = n + 1. Hence, except for the mid-point, no market has both …rms make positive productive investment. In any symmetric equilibrium, v k = v 2n+1 (k 1) . We must
. That is, for k < (>) n + 1, only …rm 1(2) invests.
We then consider the mid-point, i.e., k = n + 1. Firms must both invest positively here, because
Hence, we rewrite the Kuhn-Tucker conditions as
o~ ; k n + 1:
. LHS can further be written as
We have
Hence, 2 P n k=1 v 2 k + 4
:
Proof of Proposition 7
Consider the special case of n = 1. We havẽ
We can then calculate
o~ ; k n + 1. We have
which is increasing in t. So is v 3 .
For v 2 , we have
which is decreasing in t, because~ increases with it.
Proof of Proposition 8
Note that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions laid out above continue to hold in the asymmetric case:
By the argument laid out above, the ratio between the …rms'competitive rent-seeking outlays is constant across all markets,
. As a result, in each market k, …rm 1 wins with a probability
and …rm 2 wins with the complementary probability. Obviously, as k increases, i.e., on a market further away from the left end, p 1;k strictly decreases and p 2;k strictly increases.
We now lay out the following arguments successively, which build the proof for the proposition.
Claim 1 There exists at most one market in which both …rms make positive productive investments.
Assume otherwise that there are markets k; k 0 2 f1; : : : ; 2n + 1g, such that b i;k ; b i;k 0 > 0, 8i 2 f1; 2g.
This implies
This further leads to
by the fact
Claim 2 In the equilibrium, market rents are distributed as a U-shaped curve: It strictly decreases with k until a point k, and then strictly increases.
Consider three arbitrary adjacent markets, k 1; k and k+1. Assume that b 1;k 1 +b 2;k 1 ; b 1;k+1 +b 2;k+1
Recall the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Because p 1;k strictly decreases with k, and p 2;k strictly increases with k, we must have the following: If …rm 1 makes productive investment on k 1, then it cannot invest on k; if …rm 2 makes productive investment on k + 1, then it cannot invest on k. Because …rm 2 has positive productive investment at both k and k 0 , we must have
which implies b 2;k < b 1;k0 + b 2;k0 , because
However, because …rm 1 invests zero on k, we have
which implies b 2;k > b 1;k0 + b 2;k0 , because
The same argument applies to the second part of the claim. 
Contradiction.
Suppose 1 2 . This implies that …rm 1's spending on rent seeking is no more than …rm 2's on every market. As a result,
. This implies that k 1 2n + 1, i.e., …rm 1 makes productive investments on a smaller number of markets than …rm 2. At the same time, v 1;k v 2;2n+1 (k 1) must hold to make sure that …rm 1 invests for k k 1 .
These facts imply that …rm 1 spend less than …rm 2 on both rent seeking and productive investment, which contradict the fact that …rm 1 has a bigger budget, since a …rm in this game has no reason to leave resource unused.
Given 1 < 2 , the claim is self-evident by the same argument that proves Claim 7.
Assume that k 0 does not exist. We have for k k 1 , Hence, for k k 1 , Brcause of symmetry, the proof focuses on k n + 1. In the equilibrium, a …rm's rent-seeking expenditures are positive everywhere. Firms'rent-seeking expenditures are the same on each segment, which we denote by x k . As in the baseline model, only one …rm invests in each segment except the midpoint n + 1. o~ ; k n + 1:
The rent-dissipation rate x k /v k = strictly decreases with k for k n+1, and increases for k n+1.
Clearly, v k must strictly decrease with k for k n + 1, and strictly increase for k n + 1. ; which strictly decreases with t. However, as in the baseline model, rent-dissipation rate strictly increases with k for k n + 1, and strictly decreases for k n + 1.
We have yet to verify that b i;k strictly decreases with k for k n + 1. We consider two arbitrary consecutive segments, k; k + 1 with k < n. 
:
It is obvious to see b 1;n > 2b 1;n+1 .
We now calculate the sum of …rms's rent-seeking expenditures. By symmetry, the sum can be given by 2 P 2n+1 k=1 x k = 4 P n k=1 x k + 2x n+1
For market segment 1 to n;
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